The New York Yankees have re-signed Paul Goldschmidt to a one-year, $4 million contract, bringing back the 38-year-old first baseman for a second season in the Bronx. But this is not the Goldschmidt the Yankees signed last year. That version came with a $12.5 million price tag and the expectation that he would be the everyday first baseman. This version comes at less than a third of the cost and is projected for a short-side platoon role after Ben Rice outplayed him for playing time during the 2025 season. Goldschmidt reportedly passed on more money from other teams to stay in New York. From a pure analytics standpoint, the question is straightforward: what does a $4 million investment in a declining 38-year-old actually buy you in projected value?
The Decline Trajectory in Numbers
Goldschmidt's statistical decline has been one of the more dramatic falloffs in recent baseball history. This is a player who won the 2022 NL MVP with the Cardinals, slashing .317/.404/.578 with 35 home runs and a league-leading 178 OPS+. He was one of the best hitters on the planet just four seasons ago. In 2023, the numbers dipped to .268/.365/.441 with 25 home runs. Still productive, but the power was fading and the batting average dropped nearly 50 points. In 2024, his final year in St. Louis, the floor fell out: .245/.302/.414 with 22 home runs in 154 games. The OPS+ cratered to 100, meaning he was exactly league average at the plate. That is a shocking number for a former MVP.
Then came 2025 in New York. Goldschmidt signed a $12.5 million contract to be the everyday first baseman, and the results were worse than anyone projected. By midseason, the Yankees had seen enough and started giving Ben Rice more at-bats at first base. Rice, younger and cheaper, outproduced Goldschmidt in nearly every offensive category. The message was clear: the everyday role was no longer Goldschmidt's.
The Platoon Split Argument
The analytical case for bringing Goldschmidt back rests almost entirely on his platoon splits. Throughout his career, Goldschmidt has been significantly better against left-handed pitching than right-handed pitching. In his prime years, this split was manageable because he was so good against both sides that it did not matter. But as his overall production has declined, the platoon gap has become the critical variable.
Against left-handed pitchers during his career, Goldschmidt has historically posted an OPS roughly 80 to 100 points higher than against right-handers. For a player whose overall bat can no longer support everyday at-bats, limiting him to the favorable side of the platoon becomes the most efficient way to extract remaining value. A platoon-only role means Goldschmidt would face roughly 180 to 220 plate appearances against lefties, shielding him from the right-handed matchups where his bat speed decline is most exposed.
WAR Projection and Dollar-Per-Win Analysis
Here is where the analytics get interesting for the $4 million price tag. A full-time player producing at league-average levels is worth roughly 2.0 WAR over a full season. In a reduced platoon role of 200 to 250 plate appearances, Goldschmidt's projected WAR falls somewhere in the 0.5 to 1.0 range, depending on how effectively the Yankees can deploy him in his high-leverage matchups against lefties.
At $4 million for 0.5 to 1.0 WAR, that puts the cost-per-win in the $4 to $8 million range. In the current free agent market, where a win is valued at approximately $8 to $9 million, this deal is either right at market rate or slightly below depending on where the actual production lands. Compare that to last year's $12.5 million for roughly the same output, and the Yankees clearly got smarter about how they allocated dollars to Goldschmidt's declining skill set.
The Age 38 Season in Historical Context
The data on first basemen playing at age 38 or older is not encouraging. Bill James' age curves show that first basemen typically experience their steepest offensive decline between ages 36 and 38, with power being the first tool to go. The historical batting average for first basemen at age 38 in the modern era hovers around .240 to .250 with significantly reduced extra-base production. Goldschmidt's trajectory aligns almost perfectly with this curve.
Albert Pujols at age 38 hit .245 with 19 home runs. Miguel Cabrera at 38 hit .256 with 15 home runs. Paul Konerko at 38 hit .244 with 12 home runs. The pattern is consistent: even elite first basemen at this age become average-to-below-average hitters. The question is not whether Goldschmidt will decline further. The question is whether the rate of decline makes a $4 million platoon investment worthwhile compared to alternatives.
Defensive Metrics and Baserunning Value
One area where Goldschmidt still provides quietly positive value is his defense at first base. His fielding metrics over the past two seasons have remained slightly above average, with positive Outs Above Average numbers despite his age. He is not the Gold Glove defender he was in his Arizona days, but he remains a reliable glove at first. This matters because in a platoon role where the offensive contribution is marginal, every fraction of a win from other sources becomes meaningful.
On the basepaths, however, the data is less forgiving. Goldschmidt's sprint speed has declined steadily, and his baserunning runs above average have been negative in each of the last three seasons. He is no longer a threat to steal bases or take extra bases on hits to the gap. In a platoon role, this is less of a concern simply because he will be accumulating fewer at-bats and therefore fewer baserunning opportunities, but it is another area where the aging curve is doing what it always does.
Why Goldschmidt Passed on More Money
The fact that Goldschmidt turned down larger offers from other teams to stay with the Yankees at $4 million is the most telling detail in this entire story. It suggests two things. First, the other offers likely came with expectations of a larger role, perhaps everyday at-bats, which would expose his declining skills across a full season of plate appearances. Second, Goldschmidt understands that being a part-time player on a contending team in New York provides something that a full-time role on a lesser team cannot: October baseball. For a player with only one World Series appearance in his career, with the 2023 Cardinals, the chance to compete for a championship apparently outweighed additional salary.
The Analytical Bottom Line
At $4 million, the Yankees are not paying for the Paul Goldschmidt who won an MVP in 2022. They are paying for a veteran platoon bat who provides 0.5 to 1.0 WAR against left-handed pitching, league-average defense at first base, and invaluable clubhouse presence for a team with World Series aspirations. The advanced numbers indicate further decline is virtually certain. His bat speed, exit velocity trends, and age-related performance curves all point in the same direction. But the structure of this deal, reduced salary for a reduced role, shows that the Yankees' analytics department learned from the $12.5 million overpay last season. This is a mathematically sound allocation of resources for a team that already has its core lineup in place and simply needs a reliable left-handed pitching specialist off the bench and in the short side of a first base platoon. At $4 million, the downside is minimal and the upside is a veteran who can still punish lefties in October.